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Economic regulation to 
supplement bidding
for public works contracts
Eugenio Rivera Urrutia
C oncessions for public works projects have enabled Chile to 
modernize its infrastructure; however, these arrangements have also 
raised certain issues that make it necessary to change the rules governing 
the system. The main problem has been the addition of numerous 
supplementary agreements to the original contracts. Under the present 
system, renegotiations are not conducted according to criteria of economic 
efficiency, and they can therefore affect public finance and lead to 
opportunistic behaviour, affecting the efficacy of the bidding process. A 
regulatory system allowing for compensation of investors when it is not 
feasible to put out a new tender is more consistent with economic theory 
and provides a better way to assess the economic value of a project that 
has been changed. Bidding does not replace regulation; rather, because 
contracts are bound to be incomplete, the two methods complement each 
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  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily refl ect the views of the organizations with which 
he is associated.
The publ ic  works concessions industry has 
revolutionized and speeded up the modernization of 
Chile’s infrastructure. Projects carried out through 
concessions include the modern network of interurban 
highways that spans the country, the system of urban 
freeways in the main cities, the airport system and 
several large-scale public building projects. Thanks to 
this industry, it has also been possible to move ahead 
with more diffi cult projects, such as hospitals and other 
equally complex initiatives.
Nevertheless, a number of problems have arisen that 
make it necessary to change some of the rules governing 
this industry. The main problem is unquestionably the 
need to deal with large number of supplementary 
agreements. Public works contracts resulting from a 
bidding process are incomplete, so adjustments have to 
be made to allow for different types of contingencies. 
These contingencies may involve minor situations such 
as requests made by the community, shortcomings 
in specifi c projects or unforeseen diffi culties. Others 
are more signifi cant, such as those arising from the 
dynamic nature of roadway systems, which account for 
the bulk of the concessions granted. Indeed, population 
growth, increased economic activity, rising incomes and 
a growing motor vehicle fl eet can cause concession 
contracts to become outdated, making changes 
necessary so as to meet the demand for expanded 
road systems. When new projects are involved, it is 
certainly possible to put out a new tender, but given 
the constantly changing nature of these road systems 
and the resulting need for further amendments to the 
contracts in question, the unlimited use of franchising 
will not be the best solution.
Bearing in mind these circumstances, the Ministry 
of Public Works has proposed a legislative amendment 
that would regulate decision making on supplementary 
agreements and assign to a future Off ice of the 
Superintendent of Public Works the responsibility 
for reporting on such agreements. Although the 
proposed amendment is on the right track, this article 
explores the possibility of taking the idea further, 
bearing in mind that because concession contracts are 
necessarily incomplete, renegotiations are inevitable. 
Thus, a regulatory system is proposed that would 







The participation of private capital in infrastructure 
development posed a number of problems for proponents 
of the concession system inasmuch as it was diffi cult 
to apply the regulatory mechanisms that were used in 
other areas of public service infrastructure. Ownership 
of infrastructure works could not transferred to 
concessionaires, substantial investments were required, 
and the risks involved were considerable. In addition, 
private investors were reluctant to place themselves under 
governmental oversight authorities. thus, public works 
franchising provided a way to include the private sector 
in the development of public works and services.
This system has two unique features. Firstly, 
even though it is applied in industries that might be 
characterized as natural monopolies, it does allow for 
competition. Indeed, public utility franchising1 arose 
1 A highway franchising mechanism is a set of rules which: (i) specify 
how the winner of the concession will be chosen; (ii) establish 
restrictions on the concessionaire’s operation of the roadway 
monopoly (e.g., imposing a maximum toll), and (iii) determine how 
53C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 5  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 8
ECONOMIC REGULATION TO SUPPLEMENT BIDDING FOR PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS  •  EUGENIO RIVERA URRUTIA
from the idea of market “competition” developed by 
Demsetz (1968) in his pioneering article entitled “Why 
regulate utilities?”. According to Demsetz, market 
competition made it possible to take advantage of 
competitive mechanisms, eliminate public bureaucracy 
and minimize the reporting requirements associated 
with regulatory mechanisms. This proposal was 
presented as an alternative to the much-criticized 
regulation of monopolistic markets.
The second characteristic is that the concessionaire’s 
obligations and the economic terms for the supply 
of services are not governed by a general law but 
rather by a public works concession contract that is 
only loosely based on the Public Works Concessions 
Act. Consequently, if the conditions prevailing at the 
beginning change, it is diffi cult to amend the contract. 
This infl exibility creates two problems. The fi rst is 
that one of the contracting parties is usually more 
interested in having the contract amended than the 
other, thus giving the latter party more bargaining 
power. The second problem is that the project in 
question is described in detail in the tender, so any new 
request, even for amendments to correct an omission, 
is considered a new requirement that must be fi nanced 
by the State. This involves extremely cumbersome 
procedures in which the concessionaire must show 
that the change goes beyond the scope of the original 
contract and that it is the responsibility of the State. 
The State, for its part, tries to reduce its contribution 
as much as possible.2
the risks and the prof its or losses of the business are to be 
distributed among the concessionaire, the users and the State 
(Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 1996).
2 In discussions on this issue, it has been noted that, as common 
sense would suggest, if the conditions prevailing when the contract 
was signed change, and it has to be amended, it is easier to do this 
if the obligations of the parties and the basic economic conditions 
are spelled out in a contract than if they are simply regulated by law, 
provided no discussions relating to the need for compensation are 
involved . This is usually the ideal situation, and probably the most 
prevalent one when it comes to contracts between private parties; 
however, in renegotiating such contracts, it is often necessary to 
take the matter to arbitration. The issue is more complicated in the 
case of contracts between the public sector and the private sector. 
For the Government, the works involved are usually undertaken to 
satisfy a commitment it has made to the voters; any delay will affect 
many different sectors, so it is willing to agree to any demand on 
the part of the private sector in order to ensure that the project is not 
delayed. This is even more likely if the obligations in question will 
have implication for the users (when there are rate changes) or the 
public budget under subsequent administrations. The main problem, 
however, is one that is considered settled, namely, how much will 
the additional work cost? In competitive markets, prices are decided 
by the market: the most effi cient operators displace the less effi cient 
ones, ensuring that gains in productivity will be generated and that 
Thus —contrary to the situation with regulation 
of other public utilities— the rules, incentives and 
economic conditions governing public works franchises 
are specifi ed during the tendering process. The current 
Concessions Act identifi es several criteria that can be 
applied in the bidding process, including minimum 
rates, higher payments for existing infrastructure, lower 
subsidies or a combination of technical and economic 
considerations.3 More recently, the World Bank 
has recommended the use of two mechanisms: one 
providing for an initial payment and an annual payment 
(Guasch, 2004) and one that entails using the least 
present value of revenue (LPVR), as suggested by Engel, 
Fischer and Galetovic (1996) on the basis of ideas 
developed at the General Directorate of Concessions.4 
Thus, in the concessions system, the Ministry of Public 
Works lays down the basic structure of the business 
model and the factors to be considered in the bidding 
process, and the concession for the project in question 
is awarded to the bidder that makes the offer that is 
best for the State.
In practice, however, it has become clear that 
franchising is not enough to settle once and for all 
the issue of the economy of concessions. Given the 
incomplete nature of the contracts involved and the 
resulting impossibility of foreseeing every situation 
that might arise, it has become necessary to amend the 
contracts so as deal with contingencies, make needed 
adjustments to meet signifi cant increases in demand, 
and address other changes in circumstances.
Under the Concessions Act, a supplementary 
agreement is a contract entered into by a concessionaire 
and the State, during the period of the concession, 
when the work covered by the concession does not 
they will eventually be passed on to consumers. A similar situation 
obtains in the case of franchising and regulation in markets that 
are economic in nature. The current problem with renegotiations in 
the concession system is the absence of a mechanism for ensuring 
effi cient performance on the part of concessionaires (there is no 
competition). Either they are paid what they ask for or the parties 
go to arbitration, in which case, for reasons that are not relevant 
for the purposes of this article, the decision is not based on an 
effi ciency analysis. To this conceptual diffi culty is added the lack 
of public resources to allow for such an analysis to be made. This 
is why the bill submitted by the Ministry of Public Works proposes 
that the Offi ce of the Superintendent of Public Works should state 
its opinion on these renegotiations. This point was mentioned by the 
anonymous reviewer of this article. The issues raised in this footnote 
are discussed further in this article.
3 See article 7 of Decree Nº 900 of the Ministry of Public Works, 
enacted on 31 October 1996 and published on 18 December 1996, 
which lays down the revised, coordinated and systematized text of 
MOP decree Nº 164, of 1991, which has the force of law.
4 This is discussed further in section IV of this article.
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adequately provide the service in question at the 
levels defined in the concession contract, and it is 
considered advisable to expand it or improve it either 
at the initiative of the State or at the request of the 
concessionaire. Article 20 of the Act stipulates that 
the agreement should specify the conditions under 
which the works are to be carried out and how they 
will affect user fees, any other economic factor or 
the duration of the concession and provides that the 
Ministry of Public Works is empowered to include in 
the agreement, as compensation, only one or several 
of those factors at a time. A supplementary contract 
is also generated when it is in the public interest to 
change the specifi cations of the works and the services 
contracted for, in which case appropriate compensation 
is paid to the concessionaire. The terms of the tender 
establish how and when a concessionaire may request 
a review of user fees, of the formula for adjusting them 
or of the duration of the concession, when justifi ed 
by circumstances; such a review may be requested 
for one or several of these factors at the same time. 
Supplementary agreements are different from tenders in 
that they are not competitive, and they always depend 
on the negotiating capacities of the Ministry of Public 
Works and of the concessionaire.
Although negotiation is inevitable because 
of the incomplete nature of concession contracts, 
the possibility of renegotiating provides a strong 
incentive for the fi rms concerned to develop a two-
price strategy, the fi rst price to be used in obtaining 
the concession and the second to be negotiated 
afterwards. This may discourage more effi cient fi rms 
with fewer political contacts from participating, a 
situation that works against legal certainty. Moreover, 
as international experience has shown, public-private 
cooperation arrangements that offer special benefi ts to 
concessionaires because of loopholes in the legislation 
have ultimately compromised their own legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public. As a result, such arrangements 
may no longer be considered, or concessions that are 
already in operation may even be terminated. Certain 
cases in Argentina and Mexico provide clear evidence 
of this situation.
International experience clearly shows that the 
usefulness of bidding as a mechanism for encouraging 
market competition is diminished by the high incidence 
of contract renegotiation, often shortly after a contract is 
awarded. According to Guasch (2004), this undermines 
the competitive auction allocation process, consumer 
welfare and sector performance; moreover, if concessions 
are renegotiated shortly after their award, the initial 
bidding or auction turns into a bilateral negotiation 
between the winning operator and the government, 
undermining competitive discipline of the auction. A 
similar view has been expressed by other authors (Engel, 
Fischer and Galetovic, 2000). Once the contract is 
awarded, the operator has signifi cant leverage, because 
the government is often unable to reject renegotiation 
and is usually unwilling to claim failure and let the 
operator abandon the concession for fear of political 
backlash and additional transaction costs. In such cases, 
the operator, through renegotiations, can undermine all 
the benefi ts of the bidding- or auction-led competitive 
process (ibid., p. 33).
Renegotiation occurs when the original contract 
and the fi nancial impact of a concession contract are 
signifi cantly altered, and such changes were not the 
result of contingencies spelled out in the contract 
(Guasch, 2004, p. 34). If bidders think that opportunistic 
renegotiation is feasible and likely, the bid will not be 
won by the most effi cient investor but rather by the 
most skilful negotiator and the one that seems to have 
the best contacts in the circles of power.5
There are many explanations for the problems 
associated with renegotiations, including poor project 
design and the haste with which the ambitious public 
works programme was developed. Naturally, steps 
must be taken to deal with each of these factors. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested in this article that 
formalizing the processes and procedures involved in 
drawing up supplementary agreements – along the lines 
of regulations applied in regard to other utilities by an 
independent technical unit, such as the future Offi ce 
of the Superintendent of Public Works – would help 
prevent potentially opportunistic behaviour on the part 
of those concerned. This proposal is discussed in detail 
in section V of this article.
5 Similar conclusions were drawn by Engel, Fischer and Galetovic 
(1996), who point out that other countries’ experiences show that 
renegotiation of a concession contract often occurs when the company 
that won the tender has made a bad deal, in which case its losses 
are taken over by the State or by the users. This is not desirable, 
not only because of the transfers of wealth that are involved, but 
also because the fi rms that are willing to offer better terms in the 
tender are always not the most effi cient ones, but rather the ones that 
expect to renegotiate the contract favourably once they have won the 
concession. Therefore, any tender mechanism that is chosen should 
make it less likely that the contract will be renegotiated. This will not 
only benefi t both the State and the users, it will also work in favour of 
those companies that are better able to effi ciently build and manage 
highways but do not have the power, the contacts, the ability or the 
disposition to renegotiate the contract. Finally, renegotiations may 
also be detrimental to the private sector if they allow for regulators 
to act at their own discretion.
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In Chile, the use of supplementary agreements began 
early in the history of public works franchising. It is 
generally agreed that this practice creates incentives 
that can affect the outcome of the bidding process, 
given that the possibility of renegotiating a contract 
can substantially change the terms of the original 
tender. These problems are discussed at length in the 
specialized literature, both national and international; 
hypotheses have been put forward to explain their 
causes, and different formulas have been suggested 
for reducing the number of such renegotiations. This 
section discusses the different theories and solutions 
that have been proposed. Most of these proposals have 
focused on the bidding process, on the assumption 
that if it is improved, the practice of resorting to 
supplementary agreements will become less common. 
However, the strong pressure to renegotiate has not 
been attenuated. 
Although not in a systematic manner, the main 
stakeholders in the concessions system have discussed 
the reasons for the widespread use of supplementary 
agreements.6 One view that has been expressed 
repeatedly has been that the Offi ce of the Coordinator 
of Public Works Concessions has lacked the fi nancial 
resources necessary to carry out the studies needed 
for proper project preparation. However, some staff 
members of the Ministry of Finance have held that the 
necessary resources have always been available. Former 
offi cials of the Offi ce of the Coordinator of Public 
Works Concessions tend to agree with that view and 
point out that the main problem has been the pressure 
to develop projects as a matter of urgency: their social 
profi tability was so high that it was effi cient, from 
the standpoint of the country, to speed up the bidding 
process even if potential renegotiations would add to 
the cost. This approach is confi rmed by the fact that 
government authorities and concessionaires followed 
a basically cooperative approach to public-private 
partnerships. A joint effort was needed, and since it 
6 As of July 2007, 85 supplementary agreements had been signed 
in connection with 41 of the 51 projects for which concessions had 
been granted during the period 1993-2006.
was a pioneering endeavour, there was the potential for 
mistakes to be made; thus, an attitude of collaboration 
was needed to deal with any problems that might 
arise. Other explanations put forward ranged from the 
argument that it would have been helpful to obtain the 
services of fi rms specializing in project optimization, 
to the idea that those concerned cut some corners in 
order to make the projects more attractive. The process 
of bidding for jails seems to have been a special case. 
Because the jails were urgently needed and because 
of the innovative nature of the projects, it seemed 
to be a good idea to invite bids on a preliminary 
project so that fi rms specializing in this fi eld could 
also compete in terms of the innovations included in 
their technical projects.
As far as academic analysis is concerned, 
considering the high frequency of renegotiations, more 
systemic explanations were sought, as well as solutions 
that would be consistent with those explanations. From 
an early stage, analysts stressed that renegotiations 
posed a problem for the development of the tendering 
mechanism. A theoretical framework was needed to 
explain the problem and identify possible solutions.
1. Minimum income guarantees
One of the earliest proposals was stated in systematic 
terms by Gómez-Lobo and Hinojosa (1999) and 
was the predominant view held by authorities. The 
problem was attributed to the fact that in order to 
obtain concessions, fi rms were submitting bids that 
would not allow them to recover their investment and 
thus could lead them to bankruptcy. Why would a fi rm 
devise a strategy that would lead to fi nancial loss? 
Some of the more plausible explanations offered are: 
(i) when several projects are going to be concessioned, 
fi rms may be interested in giving a signal of low cost 
or aggressive behaviour to other bidders in order to 
discourage some competitors from participating in 
future contests; (ii) when construction fi rms are the 
principal consortium partner, the chief interest in the 
project may derive from the ensuing construction 
contracts rather than the subsequent operation of the 
III
Improving the bidding mechanism as a way
to improve the concessions system
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concession, so they may bid below costs in order to 
secure the construction contracts and later pass on 
the costs to other consortium partners or creditors; 
(iii) fi rms may behave opportunistically, bidding low 
with the aim of renegotiate ex post; and (iv) there may 
be optimization mistakes on the part of bidders. 
The authors cited stress that whatever the 
underlying cause, low-bids that risk the financial 
stability of the concession should be avoided. Otherwise, 
the competitive bidding process does not guarantee that 
the most effi cient fi rm wins the franchise. In addition, 
if subsequent fi nancial distress forces a renegotiation, 
the ex post economic conditions of the concession 
may not be as benefi cial to society as they could be. 
Furthermore, the fact that a government is seen to 
renegotiate contracts may be a very dangerous signal 
to give to future bidders.
In order to reduce the chances of renegotiation, 
some tenders attempted to establish a minimum toll 
level. If two or more fi rms bid the minimum value, 
the winner is chosen as the fi rm that offers the highest 
transfer directly to the government. Because this 
transfer would be made by the investors that make 
up the winning consortium, and not the concession 
company, which is a single-purpose fi rm, the pressure 
to renegotiate would be reduced (Gómez-Lobo and 
Hinojosa, pp. 10 and 11). No information is available 
on whether this measure was effectively applied. What 
is clear is that renegotiations have been widespread, 
reaching on average nearly two supplementary 
agreements per concession.
2. Least present value of revenue
A second approach is the one proposed by Engel, Fischer 
and Galetovic on the basis of formulas developed by the 
General Directorate of Concessions. These authors claim 
that their proposal to base the tendering process on the 
least present value of revenue (LPVR) helps discourage 
renegotiation. Underlying the proposal is the idea that 
the main reason for the high number of renegotiations 
is the interest of concessionaires in reducing the risks 
they face. Indeed, in Engel, Fischer and Galetovic 
(2001), these authors begin by arguing that one of 
the main risks of privatizing is that of substituting a 
public monopoly for a private one, a risk that should 
be avoided or regulated. In their view, there are three 
ways to regulate or eliminate monopoly power:
(i) technological innovation, which may render a 
competitive market possible, as in the case of 
electricity generation. In such circumstances, little 
intervention by the regulator is needed beyond 
creating market-like conditions;
(ii) requiring firms to periodically compete for a 
franchise, as in the case of highways. In this case, 
the regulator has a more active role, setting and 
enforcing both tolls and quality standards;
(iii) the possibility that the service associated with 
the infrastructure may be provided by a standard 
regulated public utility.
These authors, referring to Laffont and Tirole 
(1993), are mistrustful of direct regulation, since the 
regulated fi rms have better information about relevant 
cost and demand parameters, which makes it hard 
for the regulator to extract their monopoly rents and 
enforce quality standards. Moreover, they hold that 
regulatory institutions are often “captured” by the fi rms 
they are supposed to regulate or that, as pointed out 
by Dixit (1996), because regulatory institutions answer 
most of the time to multiple principals, their incentive 
schemes tend to be weak They also argue that those 
problems are exacerbated in Chile because regulators 
are neither independent from political authorities nor 
accountable to the general public, and moreover, courts 
have little expertise in regulatory matters. 
For these reasons, Engel, Fischer and Galetovic 
(2001) say that every effort should be made to ensure 
that competition is the main mechanism for regulating 
infrastructure services. In this context, market competition 
such as that described by Demsetz (1968) would make 
it possible to achieve rent extraction; nevertheless, these 
authors recognize that a franchise establishes a long-
term relationship between the franchise holder and the 
regulator. Both are subject to Williamson’s “fundamental 
transformation” (Williamson, 1989) from a competitive 
auction into a bilateral monopoly between the regulator 
and the franchise holders, since assets are sunk and it 
is very costly for the government to switch suppliers. 
Thus, the bidding mechanism must be designed so as 
to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic renegotiations. 
Attention must be paid both to avoiding regulatory 
capture by the franchise holder and to the possibility 
of creeping expropriation by the government (for 
example, by fi xing low user fees after investments have 
been made). According to Engel, Fischer and Galetovic 
(2000), an LPVR mechanism achieves a risk-sharing 
outcome that is always Pareto-superior to that achieved 
by any other conceivable mechanism, including fi xed-
term franchises.
Under this mechanism, bidders compete for the 
least present value of the total revenues they are willing 
to receive. The franchise ends when the present value 
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of user fee revenue is equal to the winning bid. The 
government sets the maximum rates and the discount 
rate, which may be fi xed or variable. The discount rate 
is established in the terms of the tender; it may be a 
good estimate of the cost of funds faced by franchise 
holders, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) + x% or the rate for Central Bank adjustable 
promissory notes (PRBC – pagaré reajustable del Banco 
Central) + x%, where x% is the fi xed risk premium.
According to Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, the 
main advantage of the LPVR mechanism is that it 
signifi cantly reduces the risk of inaccurate demand 
forecasts, since the duration of the concession is 
shortened or lengthened automatically if traffi c fl ows 
are higher or lower than predicted. Likewise, it 
eliminates the pressure to renegotiate and to worry 
about revenues, given that franchise holders are 
compensated automatically if factors such as demand 
or user fees affect their revenues. Thus, it eliminates 
the need for demand and traffi c guarantees. It makes 
it easy to defi ne a fair compensation (least updated 
value of revenues) should the contract be terminated 
early. It encourages operators to optimize costs, since 
they receive all the profi ts; this discourages frivolous 
bidding and facilitates oversight by focusing on the 
fl ow of revenues.
Criticisms of the proposal include the following: 
The duration of the concession is not specif ied, 
making it more difficult to obtain financing, so an 
appropriate discount rate must be established. The 
mechanism places a ceiling on the concessionaire’s 
profi ts by shortening the duration of the concession 
when results are better than expected. These authors 
argue, however, that although the mechanism may 
reduce the likelihood of making high profi ts, it also 
signifi cantly reduces the potential for high losses and 
bankruptcy, since, as mentioned above, when results 
are worse than expected, the duration of the concession 
is automatically extended. Another problem is that 
because revenue is guaranteed, the operator does not 
have much incentive to maintain the infrastructure 
quality. That is why in these types of contracts, quality 
requirements (essentially maintenance) and the related 
penalties for noncompliance are important (Estache 
and de Rus, 2000, pp. 19-20). As for the question of 
when the mechanism should be applied, it is clearly 
not appropriate for concessions in which the operator 
is able to infl uence demand and in cases where it is 
hard to set, measure and enforce objective quality 
standards. All these arguments probably explain why 
the mechanism has rarely been used in Chile.
It is easier to change user fees with LPVR 
mechanisms than with fi xed-rate concessions, since 
tolls can be changed substantially without affecting 
the franchise holder’s present-value revenues. In the 
case of urban highways, an LPVR contract could 
stipulate that tolls would be adjusted annually by an 
independent body, thus ensuring that users always pay 
for the congestion costs they create.
According to the proponents of the LPVR 
mechanism, franchise contracts should include a 
provision making it easy to calculate fair compensation 
for breach of the original contract.
Despite the advantages mentioned by the 
proponents, they recognize that the mechanism does 
not solve all the problems involved in renegotiations. 
In this regard, they consider a hypothetical situation 
in which a project must be expanded or rates must 
be increased for eff iciency reasons. How are the 
expansion costs to be divided between the franchise 
holder, the government and users? How much of the 
additional income from user fees is to be appropriated 
by the franchise holder? In such cases, two options are 
open to the planner. One is to renegotiate the original 
contract, which carries with it all the problems of 
bargaining in a bilateral monopoly situation. The 
second option is to cancel the concession and pay 
a fair compensation for the profi ts foregone by the 
franchise holder. The problem with the second option 
is that the fair compensation is the expected present 
value of future profi ts had the concession continued 
under the original terms. Often this fi gure cannot be 
deduced from accounting data and is highly subjective, 
making endless disputes a likely outcome. The issue 
of fl exibility also arises when setting user fees. To 
reduce risk it is advisable to specify the schedule of 
user fees (in real terms) before the franchise begins. 
Yet this often leads to fees that ex post turn out to be 
very ineffi cient. For example, in the case of an urban 
highway which is franchised for a 20-year period, the 
high demand uncertainty discussed earlier implies that 
user fees set in advance will almost surely lead to either 
ineffi ciently high levels of congestion, or to politically 
untenable levels of underutilization.
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The process of drawing up supplementary agreements 
involves six phases: During the fi rst phase, changes 
are generated and possible reasons are suggested. From 
the standpoint of the reason or purpose of such an 
agreement, the Public Works Concessions Act allows 
for four situations:
(i) Changes in works are initially requested by 
the Ministry of Public Works (article 19 of the 
Public Works Concessions Act and article 69 of 
Regulations to Ministry of Public Works Decree 
with the Force of Law (hereinafter referred to as 
DFL MOP) Nº 164).
(ii) Works do not adequately provide the level of 
service laid down in the concession contract 
(article 20 of the Public Works Concessions 
Act and article 70 of Regulations to DFL MOP 
Nº 164).
(iii) There are errors and/or ambiguities in one of the 
documents pertaining to the invitation to bid.
(iv) Compensation must be formalized pursuant to a 
decision of the Conciliation Commission or the 
Arbitration Commission.
At least four offi cials or agents are empowered 
to initiate a supplementary agreement: the Public 
Works Inspector, the franchise holder, the community 
affected by the works and the competent government 
authority, in particular, the Coordinator of Public Works 
Concessions.7
During the second phase, information is compiled 
for the purpose of “building the case”. A report is 
prepared summarizing the works project on which 
negotiations are to be held with a view to drawing 
up an agreement. A preliminary cost analysis is then 
made, based on the size of the project. At this point, 
information on unit prices is crucial. This information 
7 This issue was discussed recently in connection with the amendment 
to the General Concessions Act. Some concessionaires have argued 
that renegotiations have usually been suggested by the government 
itself, so there was no justifi cation for its interest in changing the 
procedure for dealing with the problem. Galetovic, on the other hand, 
says that whether or not the concessionaires are the ones asking to 
renegotiate is irrelevant; the reason for amending the law is that 
the Ministry of Public Works has an interest in renegotiating so it 
can cut more ribbons, cover up its errors of design or judgement or 
anticipate expenditures in order to benefi t the government prior to 
an election (El Mercurio, 2007).
can be obtained from two main sources: the offi cial 
budget, which is not always available,8 and the technical 
bid. The offi cial budget poses two problems in terms 
of its usefulness. The fi rst is that the information might 
be outdated, since a long time may elapse between 
the drafting of feasibility and engineering studies and 
the detailed analysis of a supplementary agreement. 
The second problem is that the cost analysis does 
not take into account the discount opportunities that 
might be available to a construction company large 
enough to participate in a consortium that is bidding 
for a concession. As regards the technical bid, the cost 
estimates submitted by the fi rm that won the concession 
are not binding in regard to the economic bid and 
consequently, it is likely to include some allowance 
for renegotiation. Even more important is the fact that 
unit prices do not suffi ciently take into account the 
economies of scale and of scope that would be involved 
in the construction of the project.
On this basis, an analysis is made of the potential 
impact of the additional works on the original contract; 
this task is the responsibility of the Public Works 
Inspector and his staff. The personnel who carry out 
the actual oversight of the roadworks often lack the 
necessary technical expertise to renegotiate concession 
contracts, which by their nature are very different 
from conventional contracts. Despite the existence of 
staff that support the Public Works Inspector, there is 
considerable asymmetry of information between the 
franchise holder and the latter. While the fi rm holding 
the franchise knows what its capacity is and is able to 
arrange for the necessary studies to be made, the Public 
Works Inspector does not have the necessary resources 
to conduct a useful cost analysis, so he has to accept 
the estimates provided by the concessionaire. There 
is also another circumstance that has been mentioned 
repeatedly by offi cials who have participated in the 
concession system. Up until the previous administration, 
the authorities were keenly aware of the importance and 
urgency of reducing the infrastructure defi cits that were 
so costly to the national economy. Thus, the potentially 
higher cost of embarking on additional works was not 
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considered relevant because of the high cost to the 
country of not resolving those defi cits.
During the third phase, the legal grounds for 
changing the contract are defi ned. The legal unit of the 
Offi ce of the Coordinator of Public Works Concessions 
also takes part in this process.
The fourth phase involves the participation of the 
Offi ce of the Coordinator of Public Works Concessions 
as a whole. Drafts of the agreement are drawn up; the 
possibility of speeding up the works and the cost of 
doing so are considered, as well as the implications 
of making additional expropriations and of delays in 
going on stream. Demand and elasticity studies are 
conducted, and the cost of the works and their impact 
on operating costs are fi ne-tuned. The main problem 
during this phase is that the government has neither 
the specialized personnel nor the information systems 
and databases needed to carry out the requisite studies. 
However, the main weakness of the system is that it is 
diffi cult to systematically estimate the possible impact 
of a supplementary agreement on the franchise holder’s 
revenues; this means that the costs that are identifi ed 
must be borne in full by the State either through direct 
payments, contract extensions or changes in user fees. 
Moreover, since the negotiation is conducted on the 
basis of accounting rather than economic data, the 
economic estimates are weak.
The fi fth phase involves the direct participation 
of the Ministry of Finance, since its approval is needed 
for the operation and for defi ning the forms of payment 
and conditions. It has been stressed that the intervention 
of the Ministry of Finance will guarantee that public 
finance is adequately protected. Nevertheless, the 
possibility that the ministry can evaluate the operation 
in depth is limited. Those responsible for reviewing 
the agreements are offi cials with a different type of 
competencies and many other responsibilities, so their 
review is mainly limited to checking for consistency 
and estimating without any systematic study the 
pertinent discount rate.
During the sixth phase, the final text of the 
agreement is drawn up, it is enacted by means of a 
supreme decree and reviewed by the Comptroller, and the 
necessary changes in payments and fees are applied.
V
Regulation to supplement bidding
1. The Demsetz-Williamson debate
Despite the concerns expressed by Engel, Fischer 
and Galetovic (2001) regarding the efficacy of the 
mechanism proposed to address the issues associated 
with renegotiation, these authors are in favour of 
improving the bidding process by using the least present 
value of revenues (LPVR). In this article, it is suggested 
that the main problem with this approach is that the 
mechanism does not take into account the possibility 
that franchise holders could use supplementary 
agreements to increase their revenues, as it would no 
longer be possible to assign works on a competitive 
basis or there would be no system for recalculating 
compensation on the basis of changes in demand or 
investment requirements and operating costs, and of the 
impact of these factors on the revenue fl ows. 
In this connection, it is interesting to note how 
enthusiastically the specialized literature supports the 
auction mechanism. To paraphrase Coase (1994), it 
seems to be no accident that the literature includes 
a category for “failures of regulation” but none for 
“failures of the auction model”. According to the 
winner of the Nobel prize in economics, by focusing on 
optimal systems, economists have neglected the main 
question, which is that of how alternative arrangements 
will work in practice (quoted in Williamson, 1989).
In practice, the bidding mechanism raises a 
number of issues. Theoretically, bidding is supposed 
to make it possible for the most effi cient operator to 
win the concession on the terms that are best for the 
country. This assumption will only prove true if the 
terms of the auction are absolutely binding, i.e., if there 
is no possibility of changing the economic conditions 
that gave the winning bidder an advantage over the rest. 
The incomplete nature of the contract undermines this 
essential requirement.
Indeed, a concession contract cannot possibly 
include provisions to cover every single contingency 
or dispute that might arise. That is why the General 
Concessions Act, in articles 19 and 20, allows for the 
possibility of renegotiating a contract under certain 
conditions. This creates a paradoxical situation whereby 
the auction model cannot work without renegotiation, 
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but renegotiations in turn generate strong incentives for 
bidders to set one price to ensure that they are awarded 
the concession and with another price to be obtained 
through a complex process of renegotiations that will 
make the project profi table. As noted above, several 
authors argue that this means that bids will be won 
not by the most effi cient operators, but by those who 
are most clever and best able to negotiate conditions 
in a bilateral relationship.
How to explain this paradox? As mentioned earlier, 
the auction model in its modern version was pioneered 
by Demsetz (1968) in a brief well-known article. In it he 
argued that the theory of natural monopoly was defi cient 
for it failed to reveal the logical steps that carried it 
from scale economies in production to monopoly price 
in the market place. In his view, the determinants of 
competition in market negotiations differed from and 
should not be confused with the determinants of the 
number of fi rms from which production would issue 
after contractual negotiations had been completed. 
Economies of scale in production implied that the 
bids submitted would offer increasing quantities at 
lower per-unit costs, but production scale economies 
implied nothing obvious about how competitive these 
prices would be. The bidder offering the lowest price 
would be awarded the contract. On this basis, Demsetz 
argued that in the absence of a monopoly price, there 
would be no regulation of fi rms in the industry, and the 
price would be determined in the bidding market. The 
only role played by the government or by consumers 
was some random device to select the winning bidder. 
He thus concluded that the rivalry of the open market 
disciplined more effectively than did the regulatory 
processes of the commission.
In his critique of Demsetz, Williamson (1989) 
argued that what Demsetz called “ir relevant 
complications” were the big problems that affected 
the auction model when it was to be used not only 
in awarding concessions to the private sector but 
also when it was to replace regulation in redefi ning 
economic conditions for the duration of a concession. 
The fi rst such “complication” was in fact the matter 
of what to do when changes had to be made in long-
term contracts, for whatever reason. In Williamson’s 
view, renegotiation would be unnecessary if the parties 
to a contract could agree from the outset on how to 
deal with unforeseen events and to settle disputes by 
applying a decision-making rule that would maximize 
the benefi ts for all concerned. He argues, however, that 
general agreements are not carried out automatically 
unless both parties are fully aware of their implications 
and have the option of appealing, at low cost, to an 
impartial arbitrator; otherwise, when unforeseen events 
occur, both parties will be inclined to manipulate the 
data to their own advantage. In this regard, Williamson 
identifi es three main problems: (i) the criterion for 
initially awarding the concession tends to be artifi cial 
and obscure; (ii) implementation problems arise in 
regard to prices and costs, as well as in other aspects, 
including political ones, and (iii) it is unlikely that 
franchise holders and their potential rivals will be 
on an equal footing when the time comes to bid on 
contract renewal.9
Based on the aforementioned argument, Williamson 
(1989, p. 349) concludes that regulation —which he 
describes as an incomplete form of long-term regulation 
that ensures generally fair profits in exchange for 
successive adjustments to changing circumstances, 
without the costly bargaining that occurs if the parties 
to a contract enjoy greater autonomy— is a less-
than-optimal tool that is better than other informal 
mechanisms for renegotiating the original contract 
when unforeseen changes occur.
2. Proposals for improving
 the concession system
A review of actual experiences with concessions shows 
that the issues identifi ed by Williamson are real. But 
his analysis did not take into account the possibility 
that bidding might not be the best way to bring private 
capital into public utilities that had been operating 
as natural monopolies. In fact, what he was saying 
was that it was not advisable to require that auctions 
should determine once and for all the economic terms 
of a concession.
With the necessary improvements, tendering is 
in fact a good mechanism. But what happens when 
unforeseen circumstances arise after a concession 
has already been awarded and no further bidding is 
possible? Renegotiation becomes inevitable. Despite 
their advantages, LPVR tenders have not eliminated the 
need for renegotiation. One example is that of Route 
68, between Santiago and Valparaíso, for which a 
concession was awarded based on the LPVR mechanism, 
and for which fi ve supplementary agreements had been 
signed by 2006.
9 For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Williamson (1989, 
pp. 335 ff).
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The current renegotiation mechanism poses at 
least fi ve problems:
(i) The fact that it is widely used encourages strategic 
behaviour on the part of concessionaires.
(ii) The scope and the value of additional works, 
as well as the compensation mechanisms used, 
are discussed bilaterally. Moreover, problems 
stemming from asymmetries of information are 
considered from an accounting standpoint only, 
since no economic analysis tools are available.
(iii) Given the lack of formal procedures or analytical 
models and the shortage of specialized personnel, 
it is difficult to guarantee transparency and 
efficiency in the process and to ensure that 
the terms of the original tender will not be 
changed.
(iv) There are no limitations on how much a project 
can be changed, to the point that even its 
basic features could be altered. If taken to an 
extreme, that would be tantamount to awarding 
a concession without a tendering process.
(v) Renegotiations that do not include economic 
analysis (in addition to an accounting analysis) 
and that do not follow clearly outlined procedures 
generate incentives that undermine the very 
mechanism of tendering.
The fundamental point is that renegotiation 
renders the competitive bidding mechanism useless. 
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001) suggest that when 
a contract needs to be changed, it should be cancelled, 
and a new tender should be issued. They themselves 
acknowledge, however, that cancelling the concession 
does not solve the problem, given the diffi culty of 
determining what is fair compensation.
Moreover, putting out a new tender for a project 
on which a concession has already been awarded is not 
a trivial matter. In the fi rst place, it means suspending 
the works indefi nitely, with the cost that entails. It 
also involves deciding whether the franchise holder 
with which no agreement could be reached and whose 
contract has therefore been cancelled, should or should 
not be allowed to participate in a new bidding process. 
On the one hand, if a failure to reach agreement was the 
only reason for cancelling the contract, it would not be 
reasonable to prevent the fi rm from participating, since 
there would not be a question of poor performance. 
On the other hand, if the fi rm does participate in the 
new bidding process, it would have an advantage over 
the other parties concerned, and that would call into 
question the viability of a new tender being preferable 
to renegotiation.
If the new bidding is carried out during the 
construction phase of a project, the franchise holder 
would have a considerable advantage, as it would 
already have in place all the equipment and human 
resources required, and it would be inefficient for 
another operator to take over. Furthermore, the bidding 
mechanism poses problems even in the case of partial 
tenders required by the current amendment to the 
Concessions Act. Indeed, there would be a risk that the 
tendering process would be ineffective, given that the 
construction company working with the concessionaire 
would have a signifi cant advantage. The advantage 
would not be so great during the operational phase, 
but it would not be entirely eliminated. The current 
franchise holder’s familiarity with the project would 
enable it to operate much more efficiently than its 
competitors.
Managing a concession involves resolving many 
operational problems associated with the investments 
and expenditures that have to be made when problems 
arise that were not envisaged in the original contract. 
Renegotiation is necessary to deal with unforeseen 
circumstances such as citizen complaints, obstacles 
encountered during construction or additional measures 
needed to meet quality standards. Every renegotiation 
represents an opportunity for the firm holding the 
concession to increase its revenues. This is due to 
the fact that every service envisaged in the proposed 
operation must be described in a detailed list of 
specifi cations. Anything that is not included in the list 
represents an added fi nancial demand on the State.
The problem is how to identify these demands, 
optimize the necessary investments and decide on their 
fi nancing. At present, under the Concessions Act, this is 
achieved through lengthy and cumbersome negotiations 
between the concessionaire, the Public Works Inspector, 
the Coordinator of Public Works Concessions and 
the Ministry of Finance. Agreement must be reached 
on the size and cost of the investments required 
and what mechanisms will be used to compensate 
franchise holders. Since public fi nancing is involved, 
the competent authorities must consider in detail the 
changes that are proposed in order to decide whether 
or not their cost should be covered by the State. This 
the government must carefully monitor the concession 
operations and deal with contractual changes, although 
it lacks the capability to implement the procedures and 
economic methodologies needed.
From the economic standpoint, the value of a 
project for purposes of renegotiation is estimated 
according to accounting criteria only. In competitive 
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markets, not all investments are remunerated by the 
market, which only remunerates those investments 
that help increase productivity and allow for greater 
market participation. In the regulatory world as well, 
only effi cient investments are remunerated. In industries 
that have some of the features of a natural monopoly, 
the purpose of regulation is in fact to simulate the 
pressures that are exerted by a competitive market 
on fi rms. This is also the case in bidding, where a 
competitive market operates not within the market but 
by the market. Nevertheless, renegotiation eliminates 
this pressure to perform effi ciently. It is no longer 
possible to assess the value of a project according to 
long-term economic criteria. It is not possible to carry 
out a systematic analysis of changes in demand and 
their impact on the fl ow of revenues to the fi rm that 
holds the franchise.
In other infrastructure sectors, fi rms are required 
to provide services according to more general 
specifi cations, and they are responsible for fi nancing 
whatever changes are needed in order to maintain 
quality standards. Naturally, these investments will be 
remunerated according to economic criteria, not only by 
accounting standards. In the case of a concession, the 
fi rm receives, and executes, a list of changes that might 
not normally be made by a fi rm that was designed 
for effi ciency; hence, a strictly economic evaluation 
might not be possible, given that the States authorizes 
or decides how a project is to be carried out, and the 
concessionaire determines its cost.
In cases where negotiations are broader in scope, 
e.g., a substantial expansion of the roadway, the study 
is focused on the proposed expansion. Nevertheless, 
the original project is being changed, but the new 
focus makes it diff icult to conduct the necessary 
study of how the new overall project will affect costs 
and revenues.
Despite its incomplete nature, the contract is 
supposed to cover all aspects of the concession. At 
the same time, because risks must be considered, a 
number of issues must be left out which, if they arise, 
will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, 
making a systematic approach to roadway expansion 
difficult. Chile is currently considering the matter 
of the connection between the Costanera Norte and 
the new Vespucio Oriente concession. It is not clear 
how the increased costs of the connection and the 
increased revenues to be generated will be dealt with. 
Something similar is happening with the project to 
improve connectivity between Costanera Norte and 
Autopista Central. Another unsettled question is that 
of the relationship between congestion payments and 
the expansion of the highway system.
Both the bill amending the Public Works 
Concessions Act and the one creating the Offi ce of 
the Superintendent of Public Works leave unchanged 
the manner in which changes are made in contracts. 
They do provide, however, that the Office of the 
Superintendent must report on how investments 
envisaged in supplementary contracts are to be 
evaluated and how they would affect the services 
provided and the economic equilibrium of the bidding 
process. This is done in order to ensure that the 
economic terms are not changed to such an extent 
that a different fi rm might implicitly be taking over 
the project. This is done for regulatory purposes, since 
an opinion is given concerning the economic terms of 
the new contract (obligations of the concessionaire in 
terms of service standards and requirements relating to 
investment, operation and payment structure). Thus, a 
redesigned contract establishes the new conditions that 
will govern the concession.
Under the amended legislation, the future 
Superintendent must prepare a non-binding public 
report on supplementary contracts that must be based 
on an economic analysis and other analytical tools. This 
proposal represents a fi rst step in the effort to establish 
a mechanism for public scrutiny of contractual changes 
by ensuring that such agreements follow criteria of 
economic effi ciency and that the economic balance 
provided by the bidding process is not changed in such a 
way as to weaken its ability to guarantee competition.
On the issue of supplementary contracts, this 
article proposes a mechanism whereby a fi rm holding a 
franchise would be held responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the works in question. It focuses on the 
basic concept of concessions, which entail making the 
concessionaire responsible for the provision of services, 
thus freeing the mandator from the need to monitor 
each and every decision taken by the concessionaire. 
It would be up to the fi rm holding the franchise to 
decide what investments to make over a given period 
of time. The fi rm would have to determine how it could 
best provide the services it has undertaken to supply. 
It could decide how to meet additional requirements, 
so as it complied with specifi ed standards of quality 
and effi ciency.
Supplementary contracts would be dealt with 
differently than under the current system, under which 
each additional work is considered separately and 
several different agreements have to be signed. With 
the method proposed in this article, the works carried 
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out and the corresponding negotiations would be 
grouped together, and user fees would be recalculated 
periodically, and would be included in the discussion of 
the proposed replenishment and expansion for the next 
period. In this new context, the accounting value of the 
works is not relevant. The fi rm would have to operate 
just as effi ciently as if it were subject to competition. 
User fees would be calculated on the basis of what 
is needed to fi nance the original project and what is 
needed for the proposed expansion. If the mechanism in 
question works for minor changes, it can also work for 
a constantly expanding roadway system that involves 
developing new types of connectivity.10
The model proposed in this article does not 
include procedures for conducting individual studies 
of new works. On the contrary, once user fees had 
been established for the next period, the fi rm would 
decide what level of investment was needed to optimize 
collections and what other works would be needed in 
order to provide the services required. As a corollary, 
any amounts invested made after fees had been set 
would be included in the rate study for the next 
period.11 In this regard, and without regard to sectoral 
differences, in this study the fi rm would present its 
investment costs, operating and maintenance costs 
and the estimated cost of the capital it would need 
to carry out the proposed expansion. On that basis, 
the expansion project would be designed and its cost 
evaluated, in order to arrive at a joint estimate of the 
level of user fees needed to fi nance both projects.
The model proposed would also help solve the 
problem that arises in roadway concessions when, 
on the one hand, fees are used as the mechanism for 
fi nancing ex post the investments that have been made 
10 The recent amendment to the General Electrical Services Act, 
which is aimed at improving transmission regulations, includes a 
mechanism for supplementary arrangements that is similar to the 
one proposed here, as may be seen in the following article of the 
Act: “The annual cost per transmission segment that is determined 
as a result of the bidding process and the relevant indexing formula 
shall constitute the price to be paid for the new trunk lines and shall 
be applied during fi ve rate periods, after which the facilities and the 
corresponding assessment must be reviewed and updated in the study 
of trunk transmission.”
11 As an additional reference for construction of the model fi rm.
to provide a given service and, on the other, for the 
execution and fi nancing ex ante of future works needed 
to deal with congestion problems and to expand the 
road system. Under the existing system, contracts are 
limited to the specifi c work in question, as if nothing 
were going to change throughout the concession period. 
Thus, tolls have to cover all investments, operating 
costs and capital costs involved. A congestion fee 
is charged in order to reduce traffi c over the short 
term and contribute to the development of new works 
that would reduce congestion over the long term and 
improve the rest of the road system. However, there 
is no mechanism for establishing a linkage between 
private operations and the relevant outlays with the 
overall development of the road system in question. In 
fact, the current fee mechanism is established from the 
beginning and other than the obligatory adjustments, 
further changes are only envisaged in the event that the 
operators’ basic expectations do not materialize. In this 
regard, the new model would allow for changes to be 
considered other than those relating to the anticipated 
ranges of vehicle traffi c and other fundamental factors. 
It would also allow for the original project to be 
changed in order to adjust to the overall requirements 
of the road system by applying a fl exible mechanism 
that takes into account the concessionaire’s need to 
make a profi t while at the same time enhancing the 
effi ciency of the system.
Finally, although the bidding process guarantees 
that the business model will generate attractive 
profi ts, as well as possible additional profi ts for all 
concerned through competition on the market, that is 
not the case with renegotiations, where future profi ts 
depend on the bargaining skills of the concessionaire, 
and the transfer to users of profi ts obtained through 
productivity depend on the bargaining skills of the 
State. In renegotiations, even less attention is paid to 
what happens if vehicle traffi c exceeds expectations, 
thus increasing the franchise holder’s revenues (the 
LPVR tool seems to have made a decisive contribution 
to this). Although there is a mechanism for ensuring 
that the concessionaire shares its revenues with the 
State after a certain level is reached, the threshold has 
always been so high that this method has not worked 
in practice. Improving regulatory mechanisms would 
make it possible to address this concern.
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An analysis of the concessions system shows a 
marked trend towards the addition of supplementary 
agreements, a practice that has led to complicated 
negotiations being conducted without an adequate 
methodology. Concerns have thus been raised as to 
whether the procedures are transparent and whether 
public fi nances are being protected. It has been argued 
that there is a lack of resources for project preparation 
and that the projects were urgently needed. There is 
increasing evidence, however, that renegotiation is 
inevitable because of the incomplete nature of the 
contracts in question.
Just as renegotiation is an inevitable effect of 
incomplete contracts, the prospect of renegotiation 
creates a strong incentive for interested fi rms to develop 
a two-price strategy: the fi rst price is designed to win 
the concession, while the second would be obtained 
from renegotiation. International experience shows 
that bidding as a mechanism for encouraging market 
competition is undermined by the high frequency of 
contract renegotiations. 
In addition to the efforts being made to improve 
project preparation, which of course must continue, 
most proposals to improve the concessions mechanism 
have focused on improving the bidding process. Such 
proposals include the establishment of minimums 
for bids and the unrestricted application of the least 
present value of revenues (LPVR) as mechanisms for 
awarding contracts. It has been argued, however, that 
although the LPVR mechanism reduces the risk for the 
franchise holder, there will still be pressure to enter 
into supplementary agreements.
The issue of renegotiation has been discussed 
at length in the literature. Williamson (1989) argues 
that regulation guarantees a fair rate of return to the 
investor in exchange for successive adjustments being 
made to changing circumstances without the costly 
bargaining that such changes entail when the parties 
to a contract enjoy greater autonomy, and that it is a 
suboptimal mechanism that is nevertheless better than 
other informal types of renegotiation to deal with 
unforeseen changes.
The experience in Chile has borne out Williamson’s 
analysis. The problem is how to determine who should 
fi nance additional requirements and how to optimize 
the investments needed. Under the Concessions Act, 
this has been resolve through lengthy and complex 
negotiations between the fi rm holding the concession, 
the Public Works Inspector, the Coordinator of Public 
Works Concessions and the Ministry of Finance. The 
issues on which agreement must be reached include 
those relating to the scope and amount of investment 
required and the mechanisms for government payments 
to franchise holders. Since public fi nancing is involved, 
the authorities must make a detailed study of the 
changes proposed in order to decide whether they 
should be paid for or not by the government. This 
involves careful monitoring of concession operations 
and dealing with contractual changes with neither the 
procedures nor the economic methodologies needed.
The renegotiation mechanism poses several 
problems, including the following: (i) the fact that 
this mechanism is so widely used encourages strategic 
behaviour on the part of fi rms bidding for concessions; 
(ii) the negotiations are bilateral and the two parties 
involved do not have access to the same information; 
(iii) because there are no formal procedures or analytical 
models, and there is a lack of specialized personnel, it 
is not possible to guarantee transparency and effi ciency 
or ensure that the terms of the original tendering 
process are not changed; (iv) there are no limitations 
on the changes that a project can undergo, causing its 
basic features to be altered; in extreme cases, there is 
the potential for a concession to be awarded without 
actual bidding; (v) renegotiations that are based on 
accounting criteria but without economic analysis and 
without well-defi ned procedures generate incentives 
that undermine the very mechanism of bidding (this 
is probably the most serious problem).
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic suggest that when 
a contract needs to be changed, the way to deal with 
the situation is to terminate the contract and open a 
new tender for the project. However, as these authors 
themselves recognize, terminating a concession does 
not solve the problem, since it is not easy to decide 
on fair compensation. Moreover, stopping the works to 
start another bidding process entails a very high cost 
to the government and to the country.
This article proposes that the processes and 
procedures involved in drawing up supplementary 
VI
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agreements should be formalized in a manner similar to 
that followed in the regulation of other public utilities, 
under the oversight of an independent technical body 
such as the future Superintendent of Public Works. 
This could go a long way towards solving many of 
the problems created when the parties to the process 
engage in opportunistic behaviour.
(Original: Spanish)
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